The system bends, it rarely breaks, says U.S. Congressional expert Matthew Glassman

Around the world, particularly in India, there is a perception that U.S. democratic institutions are under strain. Has the presidency overwhelmed Congress?

The perception is understandable, but it overstates the case. The American presidency looks powerful, but constitutionally, it is weak. The framers intended Congress to dominate the system. Over time, Congress delegated authority, especially during the Great Depression and World War II, and funded a massive standing military. That inevitably expanded presidential influence. But much of that power is statutory, not constitutional. What Congress builds, Congress can modify.

The real story is not institutional collapse. It is institutional tension.

Yet many argue Congress has failed to check the executive, particularly under President Trump.

I am sceptical of the claim that Congress has surrendered. Congress still controls appropriations. It still confirms nominees. It inserts restrictions into defence authorisation laws, including language that constrains withdrawal from NATO or the removal of troops from allied countries.

Much of congressional influence is informal. Senators do not always pass a law; they pick up the phone. Oversight hearings are not just theatre. They pressure agencies to adjust behaviour. Influence does not always show up as a statute.

Where Congress did weaken itself was structurally, for example, by failing to sunset war authorisations or by losing the legislative veto in the 1980s. Those procedural changes favoured the presidency.

President Trump has relied heavily on executive orders. Does that signal executive dominance?

Often the opposite. Executive orders are fragile. They are reversible, challengeable, and temporary. Durable policy in the United States requires legislation. A president who can shepherd major laws through Congress is far more powerful than one signing unilateral directives.

Executive orders can project strength, but they rarely build permanence.

From abroad, Trump resembles other right-wing populists. Is that comparison fair?

In comparative politics terms, yes. He fits the personalist populist template: anti-institutional rhetoric, strongman imagery, and disregard for norms. What differentiates the United States is institutional depth. The judiciary is independent. The bureaucracy is entrenched. Federalism diffuses power. Those guardrails are difficult to dismantle in a single presidency.

Trump’s style is disruptive, but disruption is not the same as regime transformation.

Many in India were astonished that January 6 did not permanently end his political viability. How do you explain that?

Negative polarisation. Modern American voters often vote against someone rather than for someone. In recent elections, neither candidate entered with broad popularity. So even voters who view Trump as personally flawed may still prefer his policy positions to those of his opponents.

That dynamic does not imply endorsement of institutional erosion. It reflects deep partisan sorting.

If Democrats regain the House in the midterms, are we looking at impeachment again?

It is likely the House would pursue it. Whether it advances meaningfully in the Senate is another matter. Impeachment in today’s environment is as much political messaging as constitutional remedy. Unless there were a dramatically new event, conviction would remain improbable.

More significant would be a divided government, which constrains legislative ambition and increases reliance on executive action, further heightening institutional friction.

What about foreign policy? Does Congress still matter there?

Absolutely. Congress authorised major deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq. Defence funding runs through Congress. When lawmakers worry about alliances or troop commitments, they legislate guardrails.

Foreign policy gives presidents the most latitude, but not unlimited freedom. Bureaucratic and congressional constraints remain real.

Looking ahead, does Trumpism survive Trump?

That is the central question. Elements like tougher immigration enforcement or scepticism toward free trade may endure. But Trump’s particular political persona, his divisiveness, his instinct for media dominance, and his indifference to elite criticism are not easily replicated.

Successors may adopt parts of the policy agenda without reproducing the personalist style.

On the Democratic side, who are the serious contenders?

You are already seeing positioning. Gavin Newsom is clearly projecting himself nationally. Ruben Gallego from Arizona is often underrated, younger and electorally tested in a swing state. Wes Moore has a compelling biography, with a military background and executive experience. Pete Buttigieg remains an articulate national figure. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez commands grassroots energy, though historically the House has not been a traditional launchpad to the presidency.

There will also be pressure within the party coalition to consider diverse candidates, given demographic and generational shifts. Whether Democrats opt for a charismatic figure or a steady institutionalist remains uncertain.

Finally, from an external vantage point, should the world be worried?

Watchful, yes. Fatalistic, no. The American system was designed with friction in mind. That friction can frustrate and slow governance, but it also prevents rapid concentration of power. Institutions here bend. They rarely break.