The geopolitical trajectory of Iran-Israel relations

This relationship has shaped the geopolitical and security landscape of West Asia over the past eight decades. The present antagonism between the two countries developed after the 1979 Islamic revolution that brought Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to power. In the preceding decades, both countries enjoyed a close relationship, despite the differences under Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi of Iran. Before the revolution, both maintained a pragmatic and discreet relationship based on mutual geopolitical interests, shared security concerns and strategic cooperation against common regional adversaries. It was a mutually beneficial relationship cautiously maintained in a tense regional atmosphere dominated by the Arab–Israeli tensions.

The emergence of Khomeini transformed Iran’s foreign policy toward Israel. The bilateral relations gradually moved from covert collaboration to explicit political confrontation. Since then, they have only continued to deteriorate without any signs of improvement. The rivalry has encompassed ideological rivalry, proxy wars, alliance with regional and external powers, and divergence of interests. There has been no serious effort on the part of either of the countries to negotiate and establish formal diplomatic ties, and the relationship has continued to spiral down the path. Several factors — such as the Iranian nuclear controversy, Iranian support for armed militias against Israel, the U.S.–Israel relations — have contributed to the further worsening of the relationship. While previously the rivalry was confined to mutual threat perception, proxy wars and strategic posturing, the recently fought 12-day war that witnessed the first direct military confrontation has opened a new chapter of rivalry between the two countries.

This article is from The Hindu e-book. Iran: Revolution in retreat

Iran-Israel relations during the Shah regime

Under the Shah, Iran’s relationship with Israel was shaped primarily by shared geopolitical interests. Although the two states did not formally recognise one another, they developed substantive economic and military ties that advanced their respective strategic objectives. For Iran, the principal concerns during this period were the rise of Pan-Arabism in West Asia under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and the expansion of Soviet communism in its neighbourhood. Despite being conscious of the strong anti-Israel sentiments prevalent across the Muslim world, the Shah maintained engagement with Israel.

During the 1950s, Israel pursued its “periphery doctrine”, a strategy aimed at strengthening ties with non-Arab states in the Middle East to offset pressures from hostile Arab neighbours. The 1956 Suez Crisis marked a significant geopolitical turning point in the region. In its aftermath, Nasser emerged as the leading Arab figure championing the Palestinian cause and articulating the broader agenda of Arab nationalism.

MAJOR ISSUES: Leaders of four states mark the first stage in the building of the Aswan High Dam, from left: President Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, President of Iraq Abdul Salam Arif and President of the Yemen Arab Republic Abdullah al-Sallal, on May 13, 1964. For Iran, the principal concerns during the Shah’s period were the rise of Pan-Arabism in West Asia under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and the expansion of Soviet communism in its neighbourhood.
| Photo Credit:
AFP/GETTY IMAGES

However, following the 1967 Arab–Israeli War and Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, Iran adopted a more critical stance towards Israeli policies. Israel, for its part, sought to cultivate partnerships with non-Arab states as part of its broader strategy to counter Arab nationalism and the hostility of neighbouring Arab countries. The Shah continued Iran’s engagement with Israel despite his critical view of the war, as bilateral cooperation remained grounded in mutual geopolitical interests.

Iraq under the late Saddam Hussein’s presidency constituted a shared strategic threat for both Iran and Israel, providing an additional basis for cooperation between the two states. For Israel, Iraq’s support for the Palestinian cause and its nuclear ambitions were major security concerns. Iran, meanwhile, viewed Saddam’s assertive and often antagonistic posture toward Iran — and toward the Gulf region more broadly — as a significant challenge. Consequently, both Iran and Israel offered support to the Iraqi Kurds in their resistance against the Ba’athist regime. In 1958, Iran, Israel and Türkiye also established an intelligence-sharing arrangement, code- named Trident, aimed at exchanging information related particularly to Kurdish activities and developments within Iraq.

Former Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and the Shah of Iran went a step further to develop close economic and military cooperation between them. The two governments established secret joint ventures in third countries, which enabled the discreet flow of Iranian oil to Israel. The Arab oil-producing states imposed an embargo on supplies to the United States and Europe in 1973. Iran did not join the boycott, thereby benefiting economically from the situation. Building on the success of their energy collaboration, Iran and Israel initiated a joint military programme in the 1970s aimed at developing missile systems. Israeli research and technological expertise, combined with Iranian financial resources, provided a robust foundation for this cooperative defence venture.

Iran–Israel relations in post-revolutionary Iran

The 1979 Islamic revolution marked a profound geopolitical shift in the West Asian region. Khomeini’s revolutionary Shia ideology was not confined within Iran’s borders; he openly declared his ambition to export his brand of politics to neighbouring Gulf Arab states. He urged Shia communities in these countries to rise against their rulers. He also challenged the American presence in the region and declared to liberate West Asia from the U.S. influence. The growing ideological appeal of Khomeini’s message posed a significant internal challenge to the Gulf monarchies. To safeguard their regimes and counter the rising support for Iran among their Shia populations, the Gulf Arab states collectively established the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981.

In the very next year of the Islamic revolution, Iran started the war with Iraq that continued till 1988. Khomeini, despite the ideological differences with Israel, continued engagement with Israel as it needed the Israeli weapons for his war against Iraq. Also, the Gulf Arab countries supported Saddam as they were deeply concerned about the rise of a Shia Islamic Iran under Khomeini, who challenged their regimes. Thus, Khomeini continued his engagement with Israel as a counter-balance to the GCC support for Iraq. On its part, Israel also perceived Saddam as a major threat. Israel supplied weapons to Iran, which desperately required them while fighting against the formidable Iraqi military backed by the Soviet Union and the GCC countries. Thus, the Iran-Iraq War became a common point of convergence between Iran and Israel.

Female Iranian mourners carry flag-draped coffins of two soldiers who were killed during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, whose remains were recently recovered, during a funeral in Tehran, Iran, on Sept. 2, 2013.
| Photo Credit:
AP

As Khomeini pursued a strong anti-American posture, the U.S. objected to the Israeli supply of weapons to Iran. Besides, around 53 American nationals were taken hostage in Iran in November 1979, when a group of revolutionaries seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran. The U.S. held a policy of not supporting or negotiating with the terrorist states. Thus, Israel played the role of a conduit between Iran and the U.S. in getting the American hostages released in exchange for the supply of American weapons to Iran. The Iran-Contra affair, as it is known, which happened in the middle of the Iran-Iraq War, helped Iran receive U.S. weapons facilitated by Israel. The U.S. provided funds received from the supply of weapons to Iran to the Contra guerrillas who were fighting against the Soviet-backed Sandinista regime in Nicaragua.

However, the Iran–Israel cooperation under Khomeini proved short- lived. Israel sought to engage with moderate factions within Iran, hoping that a post-Khomeini political transition might restore a cooperative government. Meanwhile, Iran intensified its commitment to the Palestinian cause and expanded its support for Hezbollah in Lebanon, which emerged as a potent force to fight against Israel. As a result, the strategic priorities of the two states began to diverge sharply. By the early 1990s, mutual distrust had become evident, which led to a sustained period of animosity and escalating hostility in subsequent decades.

Israel and the Iranian nuclear controversy

The Iranian nuclear controversy emerged in the early 2000s. Given the Iranian leaders’ hardline anti-Israel approach, Israel developed a strong apprehension about Iran’s ambitions to make nuclear weapons, often discarding the Iranian claims that their nuclear programme is for civilian and peaceful purposes only. Israel viewed the Iranian nuclear programme as an existential threat to its security. The Israeli perception got further hardened because of the Iranian anti-Israel rhetoric and its financial, ideological and political support for non-state actors, such as Hezbollah and Hamas. Nuclear weapons in the hands of these actors is the deadliest fear and existential challenge for Israel. Therefore, as the controversy over the Iranian nuclear programme surfaced in the early 2000s, Israel recognised it as a red line for its security. Since then, successive Israeli leadership have stated that Iran’s ultimate objective is to make nuclear weapons that would ultimately target Israel.

Israel’s strategy to deal with the Iranian nuclear issue included launching intelligence operations to disrupt the nuclear programme and putting diplomatic pressure on Iran to stop its nuclear enrichment. As part of its covert operations, Israel assassinated a number of Iranian nuclear scientists. Most prominent among them is Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, who was killed in November 2020 in Tehran. Israel has also used cyber- attacks as another method to damage the Iranian nuclear programme. In 2010, the Stuxnet malware was used to attack the nuclear programme of Iran. Israel also increased diplomatic pressure and expressed its concerns on international platforms about the imminent dangers of the Iranian nuclear programme. It tried to build a convergence with the United States, Arab countries as well as some of the European countries and created a narrative of the dangers of the Iranian nuclear programme for the regional peace and stability of West Asia.

BIG BLOW: Protesters hold the pictures of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, Iran’s top nuclear scientist, during a demonstration against his killing in Tehran, Iran, November 28, 2020. Reuters
| Photo Credit:
Reuters

After a series of negotiations, former U.S. President Barack Obama was able to sign the Iranian nuclear deal known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ( JCPOA) in 2015. Israel criticised the JCPOA and was of the view that the deal does not have the potential to eliminate the progress of the Iranian nuclear weapons programme, but it merely delays the process for a few years. Israel was of the view that the JCPOA gives legitimacy to Iran’s nuclear enrichment. President Donald Trump’s announcement of the withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 aligned closely with the Israeli position. Mr. Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu intensified pressure on Iran, and more sanctions were imposed as a result. Iran was also found to have violated some of the provisions of the JCPOA — after the US withdrew from the agreement — which furthered Israeli concerns. In the early 2020s, frequent sabotage and explosions occurred at the Iranian nuclear facilities. These attacks have often been attributed to Israel, although there was little to trace them back to the country. From Israel’s point of view, such attacks would prevent the progress of the nuclear enrichment of Iran.

Iran’s response has been clear and consistent from the beginning of the controversy. Iran has firmly maintained that its nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes only. It has repeatedly denied any intention of seeking to build nuclear weapons. It has also reiterated that it is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and it is operating within its right to have nuclear technology for civilian use under the NPT norms.

Iranian support for non-state actors

In order to fight against Israel, Iran supported the major non-state groups in the region, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine and the Houthis in Yemen. Lebanon and Yemen have suffered innumerable incidents of internal instability as Hezbollah and the Houthis became armed and often challenged the authority of the state. While Hezbollah has fought wars against Israel in the past and continues to challenge Israel, the Houthis declared their support for Hamas in the War against Israel for the first time during the Israel–Hamas War. Iran’s axis of resistance, including Hezbollah, Hamas, Syria under Bashar al-Assad and the Shia militias in Iraq, posed serious security challenges to Israel. This drew Israeli pre-emptive strikes targeting these groups at different places. Over the years, these groups strengthened their military capabilities and fought wars against Israel. They gradually emerged as important forces in regional security in the West Asian region. Their presence in the Israeli neighbourhood became a permanent source of threat to the country. Regional geopolitics became fractured as a result. The Gulf Arab countries, which were concerned about the Iranian nuclear programme, also aligned their security interest with Israel as the U.S. became the common thread between them. On the other hand, Iran, Syria, and the network of non-state actors formed another bloc in the region. Iran became a major actor in the regional faultlines in West Asia.

For Israel, Iran has emerged as its foremost security challenge, driven by the perception that the country is encircled by Iranian-backed proxies. Israel contends that Iran provides these non-state actors with financial resources, military training, weaponry, ideological motivation, and political backing. Moreover, the persistent anti-Israel rhetoric articulated by Iran’s senior leadership has reinforced Israeli concerns, particularly given Ayatollah Khamenei’s repeated public statements emphasising hostility toward Israel. From Iran’s perspective, these non-state actors constitute strategic assets in its asymmetric struggle against Israel. In contrast, Israel views such groups as significant threats to its national security – threats that must be neutralised through any means necessary.

Abraham Accords

Iran’s deteriorating relationship with the Gulf Arab states during the period of Arab unrest, combined with a growing, shared threat perception of Iran among both Israel and the Arab states, created the conditions for engagement between them. Iran thus became a central point of convergence, a process further encouraged and facilitated by the United States. These dynamics ultimately culminated in the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020, through which Israel normalised relations with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain. Tehran strongly criticised the decision of the UAE and Bahrain, arguing that normalisation undermined prospects for an independent Palestinian state and believed that it could fundamentally alter the regional balance of power. From Iran’s perspective, the accords represented a coordinated effort by the United States, Israel and the Gulf Arab states to further isolate Iran in the region.

Reports subsequently emerged of secret negotiations between Israel and Saudi Arabia aimed at normalising their relationship. Given Saudi Arabia’s prominent place in the Islamic world, its recognition of Israel would have carried far-reaching implications, potentially prompting other states to follow suit. At a moment when Israel–Arab relations appeared to be moving in a positive direction, the Hamas attack on Israel abruptly stopped such progress. The ensuing conflict has slowed the momentum toward further normalisation. In the evolving regional landscape shaped by the war, Iran has sought to position itself as the principal supporter of the Palestinian cause, reiterating its position as a strategic and ideological challenge to Israel.

NEW ORDER: Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu meets with U.S. President Donald Trump prior to signing the Abraham Accords, normalising relations between Israel and some Arab countries, at the White House in Washington, U.S., September 15, 2020.
| Photo Credit:
Reuters

Israel-Hamas War and Iran

The Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, profoundly altered the regional security landscape in West Asia. Iran openly supported Hamas during the ensuing conflict, reinforcing long-standing strategic ties between the two. As the war expanded, it quickly drew in additional fronts with the involvement of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen, both of whom declared their solidarity with Hamas and engaged in hostilities against Israel. From the Israeli perspective, Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis constitute key components of Iran’s regional proxy network. Consequently, Israel maintained that Tehran was directly involved in the planning and execution of the October 7 attacks and was waging a broader confrontation with Israel through its affiliated non-state actors.

As the conflict unfolded, both Hamas and Hezbollah sustained significant losses. Israel succeeded in eliminating large numbers of their fighters and targeted several senior leaders within their organisational hierarchy. In response to missile and drone attacks originating from Yemen, Israel also launched a series of aerial strikes against Houthi positions. These developments underscored the expanding nature of the conflict, characterised by Israel’s escalating confrontation not only with Hamas but with the broader Iranian-aligned network across West Asia.

Amid the ongoing conflict, the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria in December 2024 marked a significant turning point in regional geopolitics and security. Ahmed al-Sharaa, the leader of Hayat Tahrir Al Sham (HTS), subsequently assumed control of the country. His rise to power was strongly supported by Türkiye, which played a major role in facilitating the overthrow of Mr. Assad. This regime change had profound implications for Iran’s strategic posture in the region, particularly in its confrontation with Israel. Under Mr. Assad, Iran–Syria relations had reached their highest point, with Tehran alongside Moscow providing extensive military and political support that enabled the Syrian government to survive popular protests and sustained mobilisation by opposition coalition forces.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) maintained a long- standing presence in Syria, working closely with the Assad regime to secure territory and counter the opposition coalition. This Iranian military footprint, especially in areas close to the Israeli border, was perceived by Israel as a critical security threat. In response, Israel carried out numerous pre-emptive air strikes on Syrian territory, targeting IRGC positions. The collapse of the Assad regime, therefore, significantly undermined Iran’s capacity to project power in Syria and weakened its ability to sustain pressure on Israel through its military presence and allied militias.

The fall of the Assad regime came as a major setback for Iran, which lost one of its most reliable regional partners. As a result, Tehran’s influence in both Syria and Lebanon diminished considerably. This shift worked to Israel’s strategic advantage: Iran’s supply lines to Hezbollah in Lebanon were disrupted, and Syrian territory could no longer be used as a logistical or operational platform for actions against Israel. Consequently, the Iran– led axis of resistance suffered a substantial blow, undermining Iran’s capacity to coordinate and sustain pressure on Israel through its regional network of allied groups.

The Iran–Israel 12-day war

On June 13, 2025, Israel initiated ‘Operation Rising Lion’, launching coordinated air strikes against key Iranian nuclear facilities, senior military officials and leading nuclear scientists. The stated objective of the operation was to significantly degrade Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities.

On the first day alone, the strikes resulted in the deaths of several high- ranking Iranian military officers, including the commander of the IRGC, as well as nine prominent Iranian nuclear scientists. Israel justified its actions on the grounds that Iran was nearing the capability to produce a nuclear weapon. As Mr. Netanyahu asserted, Iran could ‘produce a nuclear weapon in a very short time’ if left unchecked. Israel also believed that Iran was approaching a critical ‘point of no return’ in its nuclear trajectory. The Israeli attacks targeted the major Iranian nuclear sites, including those at Arak, Natanz, Isfahan and Fordow.

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa.
| Photo Credit:
Reuters

Then-Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.
| Photo Credit:
AP

In response to the Israeli strikes, Iran launched ‘Operation True Promise 3’, deploying a large-scale barrage of missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) against Israel. Tehran stated that the operation was a defensive measure aimed at countering Israeli aggression. It demonstrated an unprecedented level of resilience in the face of sustained Israeli attacks. Iran reportedly fired more than 550 missiles and over 1,000 UAVs toward Israeli territory. Israeli authorities claimed that approximately 80 to 90% of these projectiles were intercepted by Israel’s air defence systems, while Iranian officials asserted that the operation successfully struck several critical targets within Israel. Throughout Operation True Promise 3, Iran’s missile capabilities constituted the principal component of its offensive strategy. Consequently, Israel targeted Iranian missile infrastructure, including storage sites and launch platforms. Mr. Netanyahu further claimed that Israel had destroyed a significant portion of Iran’s ballistic missile production capacity, as well as substantial missile stockpiles and launch systems.

The United States played a decisive role in the destruction of Iranian nuclear facilities. On June 22, 2025, American B-2 bombers equipped with bunker-buster munitions conducted strikes on key Iranian nuclear installations under ‘Operation Midnight Hammer’. Although Washington initially maintained that Israel had acted unilaterally and that the United States was not a party to the hostilities, its subsequent participation strongly suggested a degree of coordination between the two allies from the outset. President Trump asserted that the targeted sites had been ‘obliterated’, while Israeli officials claimed that the U.S. strike on the Fordow enrichment facility rendered it inoperable and had delayed Iran’s capacity to produce a nuclear weapon by many years. Even Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson acknowledged that the U.S. attacks had severely damaged the affected nuclear sites.

SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE: This handout satellite photo obtained from Planet Labs PBC and dated on June 16, 2025, shows the Isfahan nuclear enrichment facility in central Iran. Israeli attacks of June 2025 targeted major Iranian nuclear sites, including those at Arak, Natanz, Isfahan and Fordow. The U.S. followed it up with strikes on key Iranian nuclear installations a mere 10 days later.
| Photo Credit:
AFP

Despite the U.S. and Israeli claims of significantly damaging Iranian nuclear infrastructure, they are aware that Iran retains knowledge of nuclear enrichment and will likely rebuild and restore their facilities in the coming days and weeks. Israel believes it will take a few years for Iran to rebuild these facilities, thus successfully delaying and degrading the Iranian nuclear programme in the short and medium term. The U.S. states that its attack has set back Iran’s nuclear capabilities by around two years. Reports also indicate that Iran may have removed portions of its nuclear material prior to the American strikes. On its part, Iran alleged that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had provided classified information about its nuclear programme to other countries, which ultimately reached Israel.

Both countries incurred significant losses during the conflict. Israel demonstrated clear military superiority in the aerial domain, leveraging its advanced and technologically sophisticated air force to establish dominance over Iran. In contrast, decades of international sanctions have left Iran with limited and comparatively outdated air defence capabilities. Nonetheless, Iran exhibited considerable resilience through its extensive use of drones and ballistic missiles against Israeli targets. Having invested substantial resources in the development of its missile programme, Iran claims to possess a diverse and increasingly sophisticated arsenal. During the conflict, it deployed a large number of missiles, some of which successfully penetrated Israeli defences and inflicted significant damage.

Implications for West Asia

The Iran–Israel rivalry has played a significant role in shaping regional security dynamics and geopolitical alignments in West Asia. The Islamic revolution of 1979, led by Ayatollah Khomeini, marked a decisive shift in Iran’s policy toward Israel. Iran’s explicit support for the Palestinian cause and its strong anti-Israel rhetoric reversed the cooperative relations that had characterised the Shah’s era. Over time, both states adopted increasingly uncompromising positions, resulting in a deepening antagonism. This mutual hardening of attitudes contributed to a pronounced regional divide, as Iran and Israel emerged as opposing poles in the evolving security architecture of West Asia.

The Iranian nuclear programme emerged as one of the most contentious issues in West Asian geopolitics. Both Israel and several Arab states expressed deep concerns over Iran’s advancing nuclear capabilities. Israel, in particular, viewed the programme as a direct threat, especially in the light of Iran’s repeated declarations questioning the legitimacy of the Israeli state. Israel actively highlighted the risks associated with Iran’s uranium enrichment activities, arguing that Tehran sought the capability to develop nuclear weapons. Articulation of these concerns contributed to the imposition of extensive international sanctions on Iran. As a result, the United Nations, the United States and several European governments enacted punitive measures that significantly isolated Iran and crippled its economy.

As the Iranian nuclear controversy persisted, its relationship with the Gulf Arab countries continued to remain strained. The Shia-Sunni sectarian differences often got politicised. Iran’s engagement with the Shia majority countries, such as Syria, Iraq and Lebanon, as its allies to form the ‘Shia arc’ emerged as a security and strategic challenge for the Gulf Arab states. The onset of the Arab unrest that started with the removal of the Tunisian president Zine Ben Ali from power in December 2010 further widened the cracks between Iran and the Arab countries. The widespread protests across West Asia and northern Africa generated significant anxiety among Arab rulers, who viewed the uprisings as threats to regime stability. Iran sought to capitalise on the situation by voicing support for protests in several countries, thereby exacerbating regional rivalries. This environment contributed to the emergence of proxy wars between Iran and Saudi Arabia in countries such as Bahrain, Yemen and Syria, where each backed opposing factions. Consequently, regional security deteriorated sharply, and relations between Iran and the Arab world reached one of their lowest points.

Iran’s support for the Assad regime in Syria and for the Houthi movement in Yemen has had significant implications for Israel’s security environment. The Iran–Syria partnership has long constituted a central pillar of Iran’s strategy to fight against Israel, with the Assad government providing logistical support for Hezbollah and permitting the presence of Iranian military personnel on Syrian territory. Meanwhile, the Houthis have emerged as a consequential actor in the context of the Israel–Hamas conflict, launching attacks against Israel and disrupting maritime traffic in the Red Sea. Together, these developments show how Iran’s regional alliances have contributed to expanding the geographical scope of threats perceived by Israel.

Conclusion

The trajectory of the Iran–Israel rivalry – from discreet cooperation during the Shah’s era to open hostility in the post-revolutionary era — highlights how changing ideological orientations and geopolitical interests can fundamentally change bilateral relations. For the Shah, engaging with Israel on the issues of mutual interest, such as the Arab nationalism of Nasser, Soviet influence, and the challenge from Saddam Hussein was of primary focus, despite the raging Arab–Israel conflict. The Shah was willing to deal with Israel despite the sensitivities involving the Palestinian issue. However, revolutionary Iran’s focus on the Palestinian issue, rejection of the Israeli state and overt ideological positioning led to a significant reorientation in the Iranian relationship with Israel. The gradual deterioration of the relationship reached a point of no return as Iran backed the non-state actors to fight a proxy war against Israel. Israel viewed Iran as the most significant threat to its national security and fought against Hezbollah and Hamas.

REGIONAL PLAYER: A vessel said to be Greek-operated, Liberia-flagged Eternity C sinks in a footage released by Yemen’s Houthis, in the Red Sea, in this screen grab taken from a handout video released on July 9, 2025. The Houthis have emerged as a consequential actor in the context of the Israel–Hamas conflict, launching attacks against Israel and disrupting maritime traffic in the Red Sea.
| Photo Credit:
Reuters

The beginning of the Iranian nuclear controversy further widened the divide. Israel perceived Iran’s nuclear programme as an existential threat, especially given Iran’s continuous anti-Israel political rhetoric. Israel, along with the U.S. and the Gulf Arab countries, played a significant role in mobilising international pressure on Iran. They called for stringent sanctions on Iran to curb its nuclear programme. Israel has also reiterated calls for more economic sanctions on Iran to stop the country from funding and arming the militia groups.

The signing of the Abraham Accords between Israel, Bahrain and the UAE in 2020 brought further suspicion between the two. Iran perceived the Abraham Accords as a joint Israel-Arab coalition intended to further isolate Iran in the region. The fact that the U.S. played the role of a mediator in the signing of the Abraham Accords raises further suspicion in Tehran. For Israel, it represented a unique opportunity to deepen cooperation with the Arab countries and explore new avenues of cooperation with them. The Abraham Accords has the potential to reshape the regional power dynamics and geopolitics of West Asia.

The Israel–Hamas War that erupted in October 2023 further widened the Israel–Iran gulf. Israel’s allegation of the Iranian planning and strategy of the October 7 Hamas attack was interpreted as a declaration of war. As the war progressed, Iran’s support for Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis fighting a war against Israel from multiple fronts uncovered all the pretensions of Iran.

The Iran–Israel rivalry has become a defining factor shaping the West Asian geopolitics. The deteriorating relationship between the two has resulted in polarisation across the region, created new regional alignments and intensified proxy wars. The Iran–Israel relationship is moving rapidly in a downward spiral path without any efforts towards a rapprochement. The Israel–Hamas War exposed the depth of mutual hostility between the two countries. Though the war ended in 12 days without a formal ceasefire agreement, the inherent differences between them remain intact. It has revealed the most uncompromising and confrontational dimensions of both states’ behaviour. The differences between them are likely to persist as long as the ideological rivalry, tensions over the Iranian nuclear issue, and Iranian support for the non-state actors continue. The persistent rivalry between these two major regional powers remains a source of regional instability and would determine the future trajectory of West Asia’s strategic landscape.

Dr. Prasanta Kumar Pradhan is a Research Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi