Nuclear deterrence and the Iran war

Despite promises that he would focus on domestic politics during his campaign, U.S. President Donald Trump has directed much of his time and energy towards “peacemaking” efforts across the globe. The latest of these endeavours has been in Iran. For Iranians, today, the argument in favour of a nuclear deterrent is painfully evident. The danger is that this logic may appeal to other countries too.

In 2003, in response to mounting American pressure, Iran’s supreme political and religious leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, issued an oral decree, or fatwa, that forbade on theological grounds the production and use of nuclear weapons. Two years later, in an attempt to highlight its commitment to peaceful nuclear development, Iran restated the fatwa to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Since then, Iran has maintained its commitment to the fatwa, though it also simultaneously enriched its uranium stocks.

As Iran inched closer towards bomb-grade material, Western governments stepped in to strike a deal. Following two years of talks, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was concluded in July 2015 between Iran and the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany. This was the high-point of the U.S.-Iran nuclear diplomacy. Iran agreed to limit its enriched uranium and also to IAEA monitoring. In turn, the U.S. provided it relief from sanctions.

The deal lasted barely three years. In 2018, President Trump decided the JCPOA was the “worst deal ever” and withdrew from it, while simultaneously imposing fresh economic sanctions on Iran. While the Biden administration tried to smooth things over, Iran abandoned its JCPOA commitments, having little confidence that the U.S. would actually stick to a deal.

In June 2025, Israel and the United States launched air strikes against Iran, claiming to have set back the country’s nuclear programme. It is worth noting, however, that Iran continued to insist at the time that it was not trying to develop any nuclear weapons, which was also reflected in multiple IAEA reports. In August, Britain, France, and Germany initiated a snap-back mechanism that imposed pre-JCPOA sanctions on Iran. Iran, in turn, refused to meet JCPOA requirements.

It did not take long for the fighting to restart. On March 1, the United States and Israel mounted a series of aerial strikes against Iran, killing Ayatollah Khamenei and much of the country’s senior leadership. The United States and Israel now appear to be focused on destroying or weakening the Iranian state.

Bad example

Iran’s experience is an advertisement for the value of nuclear weapons. It is also echoed by the Libyan experience. In 2003, Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi gave up his country’s nuclear programme. Just eight years later, Gaddafi was killed in an American-backed uprising. Similarly, Ukraine gave up the nuclear arsenal it inherited from the Soviet Union in exchange for security assurances. Today, Ukraine finds itself in its fifth year of war with Russia. The last decade has seen Iran go from being a party to a multi-layered, IAEA-backed treaty, to having its leadership assassinated and its scientists killed.

These examples may make other nervous countries question their own commitments to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) at a time marked by volatility and conflict. However, it is worth noting that if Iran were to try to make a dash for the bomb now, it would likely be attacked by the U.S. and Israel again to prevent it. Iran therefore faces a dilemma: nuclear weapons have the potential to provide it greater security, but the pursuit of these weapons could subject it to further devastation.

India has no major role to play in the war in West Asia and should abstain from involving itself in disputes between other states. However, if more governments in the region attempt to go nuclear, it could be detrimental to Indian interests. The presence of more nuclear powers will alter India’s own deterrence calculus, possibly forcing it to expand its own nuclear arsenal. India will also remain concerned about nuclear crises in its backyard and the safety of nuclear weapons. The surest way to reduce the incentive for nuclear weapons is for governments to stop attempting to change regimes in other countries. If that doesn’t happen, India will face a new set of strategic challenges in the decades to come.

Adya Madhavan is a researcher at the Takshashila Institution. Views expressed are personal