Myanmar’s military-scripted polls, India’s strategic bind

Five years after the February 1, 2021 coup, Myanmar’s military sought to manufacture political normalcy through elections held in three phases between late December 2025 and January 2026. Predictably, the military-aligned Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) won. The outcome was barely a surprise since voting was permitted in only 265 of the country’s 330 townships, with a controlled political participation.

Polling was largely confined to urban wards, as most rural areas remain under resistance influence. The junta claimed an overall voter turnout of around 55% — roughly 13.14 million of 24 million eligible voters. This sharp decline, from the roughly 70% turnout recorded in 2015 and 2020, reflects not voter apathy, but widespread rejection of a military-scripted political exercise.

The credibility deficit was compounded by the junta-appointed Union Election Commission dissolving several opposition parties, including the National League for Democracy (NLD), the Arakan National Party, and the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy, with senior leaders jailed. Senior General Min Aung Hlaing fielded dozens of serving and retired military figures under the USDP banner, which has now claimed sweeping victories. The new Parliament is slated to be formed within two months.

Elections amidst war; India’s response

Since the coup, at least 7,738 people, including activists, journalists, and civilians, have been killed, while over 30,000 have been arrested. Of these, 22,767 remain in detention, including NLD leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and former president U Win Myint, and 11,497 have been sentenced, often on politically motivated charges. More than 1,13,000 houses and structures have been destroyed, particularly in Sagaing and Magway.

The regime’s brutality has fuelled the growth of resistance groups, notably the People’s Defence Forces, which now operate alongside long-established ethnic armed organisations and control large swathes of territory, including 91 towns.

Despite the elections, these groups exert significant influence, constraining the USDP and suggesting that the conflict is likely to intensify.

For India, Myanmar is both a strategic neighbour and a gateway to Southeast Asia, crucial for its Act East Policy. The elections, therefore, continue to pose a long-standing dilemma for New Delhi’s security and connectivity interests, without legitimising a deeply contested political mechanism.

In repeated statements in December 2025 and January 2026, External Affairs Ministry spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal has reiterated that India supports Myanmar’s democratic transition and that any electoral process must be free, fair and inclusive, with the participation of all political stakeholders. This carefully calibrated language reflects India’s attempt to uphold democratic principles while avoiding a complete diplomatic rupture with Naypyitaw. During the same period, New Delhi also clarified that any Indians who had visited Myanmar during the election process had done so in their personal capacity, signalling a distance and absence from the political exercise.

High-level engagement has continued alongside this calibrated rhetoric. On the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting in August 2025, Prime Minister Narendra Modi met Senior General Min Aung Hlaing to review bilateral ties and explore avenues for cooperation. While reiterating India’s readiness to support Myanmar’s developmental needs, the Prime Minister also emphasised the importance of conducting free, fair, and inclusive elections involving all stakeholders. The message was clear: engagement would continue, but without explicit political endorsement.

Amidst this, India has continued to play its humanitarian role by sending relief teams, humanitarian and medical assistance, and the establishment of a temporary field hospital under Operation Brahma during the March 2025 earthquake, which allowed New Delhi to remain engaged while avoiding legitimisation of the regime.

Implications for India

Myanmar shares a 1,643-kilometre border with four of India’s northeastern States, making instability across the frontier inseparable from India’s internal security. Violence and state collapse have already triggered refugee inflows into the nation. India currently hosts 90,100 displaced Myanmar nationals in Mizoram and Manipur. The absence of a coherent national refugee policy places disproportionate burdens on State governments, thus exposing faultlines in this respect. Continued post-election instability is likely to sustain such movements.

Indian-backed projects, including the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project and the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway, have faced repeated delays due to insecurity in conflict-affected regions. The junta’s claims of post-election normalisation will be difficult to translate into improved implementation conditions, forcing New Delhi to reassess timelines, risk exposure and engagement strategies.

Moreover, transnational security threats — for instance, the proliferation of narcotics and human trafficking networks — have accelerated amid weakened border controls and fragmented authority. Of particular concern is the rapid expansion of cyber scam centres and cyber slavery networks operating in border conflict zones in Myanmar, from where 2,165 Indians have been rescued since 2022, but more still remain within the shackles. These developments present emerging non-traditional security challenges, underscoring the need for coordinated and clearer domestic and regional policy responses.

The path for New Delhi

As western and regional blocs such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) refuse to recognise the election outcomes for now, it becomes essential for India to maintain its balanced approach. New Delhi is likely to sustain limited engagement with the regime in power to protect core interests, while simultaneously maintaining contacts with local actors, which it has already been doing in recent times.

Myanmar’s elections have, therefore, not marked a turning point. For India, they underline a hard truth: managing relations with a fractured neighbour will require balancing principles with pragmatism — at a time when neither offers an easy exit.

Harsh V. Pant is Vice-President, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. Sreeparna Banerjee is Associate Fellow, Neighbourhood Studies, Observer Research Foundation

Published – February 09, 2026 12:08 am IST