Gen Z and the dynamics of democratic engagement

Democracies across the globe have been witnessing backsliding and counter-narratives have not been too successful in arresting the malaise. In this context, Generation Z, or Gen Z (those born roughly between 1997 and 2012), has emerged as a renewed source of hope at a time when many people had begun to resign themselves to authoritarian regimes and their unresponsive governance.

In Bangladesh (2024) and Nepal (2025), Gen Z has spearheaded regime-challenging protests, mobilising around issues of corruption, transparency and institutional accountability. These sporadic protests proved to be more effective than the earlier round of such mass protests, examples being the Occupy Wall Street in the United States (2011), the Arab Spring (the early 2010s), and the Brazilian Spring (2013). Some of these protests hit the headlines but did not make effective policy changes, leave alone regime change. So, how do we make sense of such sudden eruptions?

Every generation recalibrates ethics, values and social practices in a manner that is distinct from the previous generations. Therefore, it takes time to make sense of what the new generations think and say — the ingredients of old practices and imagination melt into a new recipe. The old has an ‘absent presence’ in the way the new gets articulated. The new looks like a distorted version of the old, and the older generations, understandably, feel disappointed and disturbed.

The essence, its worldview

Long dismissed as preoccupied, politically disengaged, and lost in the virtual world, Gen Z defied expectations by expressing anguish in such an ‘organised way’. Observers continue to interpret such movements as flash-in-the-pan political mobilisations — characterised by pointed demands but marked by an episodic and short-lived presence. One can make better sense of such political events only if one gets to understand the emergent political subjectivity of Gen Z, beyond conventional registers. While democracies are typically understood in terms of constitutional frameworks and institutional structures, their true substratum consists of shifting everyday moral practices and latent collective emotions.

To begin with, Gen Z is an uncanny combination of radical individualism and social indifference, but with less prejudice and a less jaundiced view of the world. It is too removed to be myopic, too nonchalant to be emotional, and too indifferent to be prejudiced and discriminatory. Gen Z seems to believe in a worldview that the ‘personal is political’ but political is not personal. It is not involved in worldly affairs but that does not mean it lacks a worldview.

Being political seems to matter the most in its personal conduct and the way it is treated. In essence, it operates primarily as exemplars rather than as emissaries. It believes in living rather than making propositions — and, therefore, not ideologically motivated — and in making practical sense of the world. It resists being preached to and is sensitive about not preaching to others, which makes forging collective struggles that much more difficult. It responds readily to lived hierarchies but that does not necessarily reflect a structural understanding of those hierarchies.

Gen Z avoids making moral judgments about the world. It also makes people within this generation more active in the virtual world than the real one. They find it more agreeable to work and express their views on virtual platforms than attend physical meets to interact. This instinct to avoid thick face-to-face interaction has an impact on the nature of protest and in imagining democratic futures. It is for this reason that Gen Z is more at home with sporadic and episodic protests than organised movements; their protests are leaderless and without pronounced ideological frames.

A comparison of protests

The difference becomes clear when one compares the farmers’ movement (2020-24) with the Gen Z protests. The farmers were formally organised, had a sustained leadership and pronounced demands. They could sustain a movement for years. In comparison, Gen Z protests fizzle out and disappear without a trace but nevertheless leave a great impact behind.

The changing modes of protest also have something to do with again an uncanny combination of confidence and anxiety. Gen Z is the first self-confident generation in post-independent India but also the most anxious one. Gen Z is a result of both sustained social democratisation and fast disappearing economic opportunities. Sustained democratisation has allowed Gen Z to be more open about ‘self’ introspection.

The people of this generation are at ease with counselling and therapy; therefore, mental health-related issues are pronounced.

Previous generations were less comfortable in accepting emotional trauma and seem to have passed on a lot of the toxic and masculine stuff to the next generation. Gen Z is more conscious and wants to overcome the battles of ‘mental despair’.

The New York Times reported a sense of “mental despair” not only among unemployed youth but also among those employed, many of whom find their workplaces toxic and experience routine anomie. Much of this is reflected in their attitudes to politics and democracy. They are assertive but suffer from insecurity. The precarity of Gen Z gets reflected in its fragmented and fleeting involvement with democratic events and issues. It can assert ancient values because it demands confidence to claim one’s own culture and reject radical transformation because it is clichéd.

Unpredictable impact

Finally, one unmistakable feature of Gen Z is the connect between its self-representation or identity and pronounced consumption patterns. Market is integral to its self-making and social imaginaries that challenge/disturb the ascriptive identities of caste and religion. With a greater reach of market, technology and education, Gen Z follows global fashion trends, technological innovations and looks for newer educational opportunities.

All of this makes Gen Z more secularised but inward-looking, and giving undue importance to personal choices. Possessing the latest iPhone is seen as a great equaliser, transcending the complex debates surrounding class inequality. Access to information is a greater source of dignity than the caste and religion one is born into.

However, engagement with fast-changing technologies and information may contribute to hyper-nationalism and the propagation of empty rhetoric of the glorious past. The rise of hyper-nationalism today is less concerned with the chauvinistic superiority that Tagore worried about and more focused on projecting ambitious claims about future possibilities. India might be a poor country yet has launched space missions; despite grave inequalities, it also maintains a notable presence in Silicon Valley. Gen Z will continue to disappoint us with responses we expect, yet surprise us with responses we have not yet thought about.

Ajay Gudavarthy is Associate Professor, Centre for Political Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University

Published – February 21, 2026 12:16 am IST