Cycles of revolt: on Pakistan and the Baloch rebels

The coordinated attacks by the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) across multiple districts underline a grim truth: Pakistan’s largest province remains trapped in a deepening cycle of violence. According to Pakistani authorities, at least 30 civilians and 18 security personnel were killed in the January 31 attacks. In response, the Pakistani military reportedly killed at least 150 Baloch fighters. But such reprisals are unlikely to produce any lasting improvement in Balochistan’s security situation. In March 2025, after Baloch militants hijacked the Jaffar Express, Pakistan’s largely reactive, and often disproportionate military responses, have done little to break the cycle. On the other side, Baloch rebel groups, including the BLA, the Balochistan Liberation Front, and several smaller outfits, have established the Baloch Raaji Aajoi Sangar, a united front, for improved coordination. While militant violence against civilians is indefensible, the Pakistani state’s long reliance on coercion has fuelled the very insurgency it seeks to crush. As security conditions along the country’s tribal borderlands deteriorated in recent years, particularly after the Taliban captured power in Kabul, Baloch rebels and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan Islamists used the chaos to regroup themselves and intensify hit-and-retreat operations, leading to a rapid decline in internal security across provinces bordering Afghanistan.

Balochistan is Pakistan’s most resource-rich province, with vast mineral reserves and a strategic Arabian Sea coastline. It has drawn growing international attention, especially as the $60-billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor passes through it. More recently, Pakistan has pitched mineral extraction deals to American companies. Baloch nationalists and militants argue that extraction and infrastructure projects proceed with little transparency, minimal local participation and limited economic benefit for local communities. Security crackdowns and counterinsurgency campaigns have worsened alienation. Human rights groups have repeatedly documented enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings and arbitrary detentions. Equally troubling is Islamabad’s reflexive tendency to blame India for unrest in Balochistan, without presenting verifiable evidence. This narrative may serve short-term political ends, but avoids the introspection required. Since its annexation in 1948, Balochistan has witnessed five major waves of rebellions. Each time, the Pakistani state relied on brute force to restore order, only for violence to return after only a fragile lull. If Pakistan is serious about peace and stability in the region, opting for political reconciliation, rather than confrontation, addressing long-standing Baloch grievances, including economic and political exclusion, and opening channels for dialogue, even with rebel groups, are essential steps. Otherwise, the country risks remaining locked in a perpetual conflict with its own people.