Supreme Court of India

Supreme Court of India
| Photo Credit: PTI

The Supreme Court on Wednesday (March 18, 2026) questioned whether activities such as publication and sale of books and manufacture of food associated with temples can be considered an industry.

The oral observation came from Justice B.V. Nagarathna, who is part of a nine-judge Bench headed by Chief Justice of India Surya Kant examining the ambit of the definition of ‘industry’ and whether it would include charities and hospitals.

The question was posed to the Commissioner of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments in Tamil Nadu. Senior advocate Jaideep Gupta, appearing for the Commissioner, referred to High Court decisions that temple trust activities such as manufacturing prasadam, running hotels or operating transport were an “industry” under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and an “establishment” under the Shops and Establishments Act.

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Justice Nagarathna said she had authored a single-judge Bench judgment in the Karnataka High Court which had held that a temple was not an establishment under the Karnataka Shops and Establishments Act.

“But a Full Bench of the Madras High Court had held a temple to be an ‘industry’. The Orissa High Court had held the Jagannath temple to be an ‘industry’,” Mr. Gupta responded to the judge.

The senior advocate said temple trusts create food as prasadam. “None of it is created for commercial purposes. The Ramakrishna Mission sells books. But they would give it to you also for free. Their purpose is to propagate their religious practices. Prasadam is primarily for spiritual purposes. We partake in prasadam not to assuage hunger but to partake in a spiritual exercise,” Mr. Gupta argued.

Mr. Gupta said the overbroad expansion of the definition of ‘industry’ in the 1978 judgment authored by Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa case required a paradigm shift. He said the seven-judge Bench judgment, which is under reference by the nine-judge Bench, classified anything with an employee-employer relationship creating products as an industry.

The senior advocate argued that the definition of industry has to be understood in the context of the 1947 Act, which covered the redressal mechanism available for workmen in the case of an ‘industrial dispute’ which arose following eventualities such as strike, layoffs and retrenchments, lockouts, unfair labour practices, etc.

“There is no question of a strike or a lock-out in the case of a temple. The provisions of the Act would become incongruous if we consider them in terms of a temple,” Mr. Gupta submitted.

He said the redressal mechanism of an industrial facility cannot be grafted on to a temple.

“It is a problem looking for a solution. You have a problem. How do you provide a dispute resolution mechanism for different areas of human activity? Solution in one human activity provided by the 1947 ID Act cannot be used to resolve problems in all other spheres of activity,” he said.

He submitted that the test to examine if a charity or a spiritual activity was commercial or not would be to see if the surplus from that activity was used for further philanthropy/devotional purposes or not.

“In Kerala, the income is generated primarily from Guruvayoor, Sabrimala and the Padmanabhaswamy temples. There are thousands of temples which do not generate any income. The surplus generated is utilised for the purpose of running the other temples,” Mr. Gupta illustrated.

Beginning the counter in favour of retaining the 1978 judgment, senior advocate Indira Jaising and advocate Paras Nath Singh submitted that bringing enterprises under the definition of industry provide workmen with a remedy to ventilate their grievances in relation to fair wages, health and safety, occupational safety, and security of employment, and challenge unfair dismissals before a judicial authority.

“A democratic society governed by the rule of law is dutybound to provide a grievance redressal forum of a judicial nature to all its citizens, where their substantive rights can be ventilated,” Ms. Jaising submitted.


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