How anti-corruption bodies are politicised

It began with great fanfare. Investigative agencies announced a massive corruption conspiracy case in Delhi’s excise policy, alleging kickbacks of ₹100 crore and a deep nexus between business interests and politicians. The case, which was investigated by the Central Bureau of Investigation, with parallel proceedings by the Enforcement Directorate, led to the arrest of political figures, including then Delhi Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal and Deputy CM Manish Sisodia and businesspersons. Months of custody, prolonged interrogation, and repeated court hearings followed. The case dominated television debates for months, shaping electoral narratives and public perception.

Now, years later, the case ended with a judicial order from the trial court declining even to frame charges. The court concluded that the prosecution had failed to produce material establishing a prima facie case of criminal conspiracy or bribery. It also noted the absence of clear evidence linking policy decisions to illegal personal gain.

What began as one of the most sensational corruption prosecutions in recent memory has ended, and left us with an uncomfortable question — how did a case launched with such certainty fail to cross even the basic threshold required for trial?

Lingering questions

The most immediate question is institutional. Should an investigating agency initiate a prosecution of this magnitude without a reasonably solid evidentiary foundation?

The decision to register a First Information Report (FIR) is legally the beginning of a criminal process. But in politically sensitive cases, it also carries immense consequences — arrests, reputational damage, and long periods of incarceration before trial. When a case collapses at the threshold stage, it inevitably invites speculation that the investigation itself may have been driven by extraneous pressures.

The head of an investigative agency, therefore, needs to ensure that prosecutions are grounded in evidence rather than suspicion or political momentum.

The judicial threshold

The collapse of such high-profile cases is not unique to India. Corruption is among the most difficult crimes to prove anywhere in the world. This is because unlike violent crimes, corruption rarely leaves visible evidence. Money moves through intermediaries, shell companies, consultancy contracts, or political donations. The benefit may not even appear as cash — it may appear as favourable regulatory decisions or advantageous contracts. Hence, successful corruption prosecutions usually depend on a complex evidentiary architecture: financial trails, documentary records, digital communications, and corroborated witness testimonies.

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If any link in this chain is missing, courts hesitate to infer criminal intent. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that policy decisions taken by governments cannot automatically be criminalised unless there is clear evidence of dishonest intent and personal gain. This is exactly what was inferred by the court in the Delhi excise policy case. And while these principles protect individuals from politically motivated prosecutions, they also make corruption cases difficult to sustain.

However, the real difficulty may lie less in judicial standards and more in investigative capacity. Many corruption prosecutions in India still rely heavily on witness statements rather than on forensic financial analysis. Modern corruption investigations require sophisticated tools: forensic accounting, data analytics, tracing beneficial ownership of companies, and reconstruction of financial flows across jurisdictions. Agencies in countries such as Singapore and Hong Kong have developed specialised expertise in these areas.

In contrast, India’s investigative ecosystem remains fragmented across multiple agencies with uneven coordination.

The political dilemma

The Kejriwal case illustrates a deeper structural dilemma in Indian democracy. On the one hand, corruption in public life remains a widely acknowledged problem. Allegations surround major public contracts from liquor policies to irrigation projects. Public confidence requires that such allegations be investigated seriously. On the other hand, criminal law must not become a weapon in political hands. If arrests and prosecutions are perceived as tools of the political executive, the legitimacy of anti-corruption institutions suffers irreparable damage.

While India’s anti-corruption agencies have secured many convictions in trap cases where officials were caught accepting bribes, large policy-level corruption cases have rarely ended in successful prosecutions. When allegations of corruption surround large public contracts but rarely lead to convictions, public cynicism deepens. What India needs are credible examples of rigorous investigation and successful prosecution in huge bribery cases. Such cases would demonstrate that corruption can be punished without compromising legal fairness.

The excise policy case should therefore not be seen merely as a political victory or loss. It should prompt a broader institutional reflection. Investigative agencies must strengthen their capacity for financial forensics and evidence gathering. Prosecutors must ensure that cases brought before courts are built on robust evidentiary foundations. And political leaders must resist the temptation to deploy criminal law as a tool of partisan contest.

Yashovardhan Azad is a retired IPS officer who has served as the Central Information Commissioner, Secretary Security GOI and Special Director Intelligence Bureau.