A debate, for the most part civilised, is going on in India about foreign policy. The provocation for the debate is the ongoing Israeli-American war on Iran, now in its third week and India’s response to it. I belong to the tribe of ‘professional’ diplomats. We consider ourselves experts with special skills to propound on foreign policy issues. It is true that we are trained to read between the lines and to research whatever issue occupies the attention of the international community at a given time. However, it is not as if we are born with a particular gift for foreign policy; the gift or expertise is cultivated over a period of time. Almost anybody can handle foreign policy with experience and exposure to the issues. Everyone has an opinion on foreign policy, and it would not be correct to dismiss those opinions as ill-informed or irrelevant. The two sides The debate is argued between those who generally support the government’s stand on the war, which began on February 28, and those who criticise it as weak-kneed or surrendering to the Americans, or as hostile to Iran, a close and civilisational friend. The deliberate decision not to condole the assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has come in for particular criticism. Foreign policy is an instrument in the hands of the government to protect and promote the country’s national interests. It follows that it is within the province of the government of the day to define what the national interests are and how to protect them. Some interests are sui generis, such as defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country. For a country such as India, the improvement in the standard of living of its citizens is an extremely important objective. In a highly globalised and interdependent world, this task imposes on the government the duty to chart its policy with deliberation and calculation. A government led by one party may take one position whereas a government led by another party may take another. The same party may take one position when in opposition but might pursue that very policy when in power. The Congress-led government under Manmohan Singh decided that obtaining the nuclear deal with America was in India’s interest whereas the Bharatiya Janata Party at the time opposed the deal. Once in power, it went beyond what even the previous government had not agreed; it absolved the suppliers of nuclear reactors from any liability, for accident or defect in the reactors. Foreign policy often is, but should not be, influenced by the ideological orientation of the ruling party. If it is to adhere strictly to the objective of promoting national interest, it cannot afford to be too concerned about principles or rights and wrongs. At times, a particular position might offend our sense of justice or morality, but the government of the day will have to make an objective decision, even if it is not popular. Equally important, the government must explain to the people the rationale for its decision. In a democracy, this is extremely important. People, certainly the Indian people, are fully capable of understanding and approving or disapproving of the government’s actions. Labels and policy Much time and intellectual energy is spent on giving a label to foreign policy. The one currently in fashion is ‘strategic autonomy’. By adding the word ‘strategic’, it sounds profound and gives the impression of a concept beyond the understanding of ordinary citizens. But then, why ‘autonomy’? Why not ‘independent’? Is not independence more precious than autonomy? P.V. Narasimha Rao used to say that Kashmiris can have as much autonomy as they want, but not independence. In any case, why give any label at all? How many countries have given adjectives to their foreign policy? If a name has to be given, just call it ‘independent’. The best definition of foreign policy was given by Jawaharlal Nehru in a letter to Einstein written a few weeks before India’s independence. Foreign policy, Nehru wrote, essentially is selfish. The only principle it follows is the principle of national interest. The Narendra Modi government is essentially following Nehru’s foreign policy, that is ‘selfish’ foreign policy. Its approach to the Iran war seems to be based on a cold calculation that India has too much at stake with America and the Gulf states. America is India’s largest trading partner, and India needs its support for state-of-the-art technology, especially for developing India’s defence capabilities. As for the Gulf countries, nearly 10 million Indians are working there. Their welfare is of overriding concern. They send hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of remittances back home. Collectively, the Gulf countries are a most valuable source for India’s energy needs. Application of ‘strategic autonomy’ These are valid considerations. Nevertheless, within the parameters of these factors, the government could and should have shown some ‘strategic autonomy’. No harm would have been done if the assassination of Ayatollah Khamenei had been condoled or if the External Affairs Minister rather than the Foreign Secretary had signed the condolence book in the Iranian Embassy in Delhi. Since the Prime Minister did speak to the Iranian President to press for the safety of the 9,000-strong Indian community in Iran, would it not have been proper for him to also express condolences for the assassination? His telephone conversations with the leaders of the Gulf states would surely have ensured their support to take care of India’s citizens living there. The fact that Iran has allowed oil tankers destined for India safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz speaks not so much to the success of India’s diplomacy as to the graciousness of the Iranians. Despite India’s unfriendly attitude, Iran took a friendly approach towards India. In the final analysis, India needs to be on the winning side. The government has obviously concluded that the Israeli-American coalition will come out the winner and that Iran will be defeated or surrender. There is also the question of the Prime Minister’s visit to Israel (February 25-26, 2026), its timing more than the visit per se. It was evident from watching his address to the Israeli Knesset that he was deeply moved by the warm reception that was accorded to him by its members. His visit was a demonstration of the ideological affinity that he feels with Israel and, more so with its Prime Minister. That Israel and the U.S. were going to attack Iran any day was known to all those following such matters. The timing of the visit was unfortunate. Let the debate continue. Chinmaya R. Gharekhan is a former Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations and a former Special Envoy of India for West Asia Published – March 21, 2026 12:16 am IST Share this: Click to share on WhatsApp (Opens in new window) WhatsApp Click to share on Facebook (Opens in new window) Facebook Click to share on Threads (Opens in new window) Threads Click to share on X (Opens in new window) X Click to share on Telegram (Opens in new window) Telegram Click to share on LinkedIn (Opens in new window) LinkedIn Click to share on Pinterest (Opens in new window) Pinterest Click to email a link to a friend (Opens in new window) Email More Click to print (Opens in new window) Print Click to share on Reddit (Opens in new window) Reddit Click to share on Tumblr (Opens in new window) Tumblr Click to share on Pocket (Opens in new window) Pocket Click to share on Mastodon (Opens in new window) Mastodon Click to share on Nextdoor (Opens in new window) Nextdoor Click to share on Bluesky (Opens in new window) Bluesky Like this:Like Loading... 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