On India’s fighter jet acquisitions

India’s Defence Acquisition Council recently cleared the procurement of 114 Rafale fighter jets from Dassault Aviation. The deal is valued at approximately Rs 3.25 lakh crore.

What followed was a recent visit of French President Emmanuel Macron to India for the A.I. Summit where he committed to ‘technology transfer’ which can significantly elevate the defence capabilities of New Delhi.

Though, this comes with a caveat, reports suggest that France has firmly denied the sharing of the critical source codes which will greatly hamper India’s autonomy in customising the software systems and integrating sensors and radar systems.

This will limit New Delhi’s attempt in indigenising the operations of the Indian Air Force squadron ‘Golden Arrows’. This might also not be the only hiccup India faces in re-positioning itself in the defence hierarchy.

Assembly versus autonomy

The Indian Air Force operates 29 fighter squadrons against an authorised strength of 42. The MiG-21 fighter jets retired in September 2025 after 62 years. Pakistan maintains around 25 squadrons. China fields around 65. Operation Sindoor in May 2025 exposed this vulnerability through the largest beyond-visual-range engagement in the region’s history.

That reality underpins the Rafale procurement. Of the 114 aircraft, 18 will arrive in fly-away condition. The remaining 96 will be manufactured in India, with indigenous content targeted at 30% initially and 60% eventually.

Tata Advanced Systems has signed agreements with Dassault to manufacture four fuselage sections in Hyderabad, delivering up to 24 fuselages annually from the fiscal year 2028.

The question is whether assembly translates to autonomy. In defence aerospace, geoeconomic leverage is measurable.

It lies in the proportion of domestic value-add, control over mission software, freedom to integrate third-party weapons, and autonomy over lifecycle upgrades all of which now seems to be in jeopardy. Assembly depth without design authority alters production geography but not bargaining power.

France has positioned ‘Make in India’ as central to the partnership. But technology transfer faces a critical constraint. While Dassault will co-produce the airframe and Safran M88 engines, access to source codes for electronic warfare and radar systems remains restricted. This limits India’s ability to independently integrate indigenous weapons.

Software defines modern warfare. Every modification without source code access requires bilateral clearance and outlays to foreign contractors.

India’s experience with Mirage 2000 upgrades illustrates this, where French vendor dependency added over €1 billion in integration costs across 50 aircraft since 2011. Turkey’s TF-X KAAN programme illustrates the risks of partial transfer. Ankara secured airframe production rights but remains engine-dependent on foreign suppliers.

Diversification as leverage

Russia has reportedly offered unprecedented access to the Su-57 fighter aircraft’s source code in consultations for co-production.

The United Aircraft Corporation has signalled willingness to provide greater source code access than Western partners typically offer, potentially enabling deeper avionics customisation. This represents a strategic hedge against Western technological gatekeeping, leveraging existing infrastructure from licensed Su-30MKI production.

However, a hedge is credible only if the supplier possesses the technological and industrial depth to honour it. Russia’s aerospace industry operates under sanctions-induced supply constraints, and the Su-57’s engine programme remains in transition from AL-41F1 to Izdeliye 30.

Whether “full source code access” extends to mission system architecture or only limited avionics layers remains unclear. A hedge that substitutes one dependency for another does not deepen autonomy.

India is nearing a deal to export Su-30MKI fighters to Armenia valued at $3 billion. The Armenian variant will feature the indigenous Uttam AESA radar and Astra missiles. This marks India’s shift from licensee to modifier-exporter, signalling a new level of absorption maturity.

India’s diversification across France, Russia, Israel, and the United States prevents supplier monopoly and strengthens negotiating leverage.

Operation Sindoor validated India’s punitive airpower doctrine but exposed coordination complexities across Rafale, Su-30MKI, and Mirage 2000 platforms. The episode reinforced the primacy of software integration.

This has accelerated emphasis on Integrated Air Command and Control Systems and Theatre Commands.

Union Budget 2026-27 allocated a record Rs. 7.85 lakh crore to the Ministry of Defence, an increase of over 15%. Capital outlay surged by over 20% to Rs 2.19 lakh crore. Approximately 75% of the capital budget, Rs. 1.39 lakh crore, is earmarked for domestic procurement under the Boosting Indigenous Defence Manufacturingcategory.