Pakistan’s arms sales drive calls for India’s attention

Although largely ignored by India, a couple of historic benchmarks were created in Rawalpindi on February 2. Pakistani Chief of Defence Forces Asim Munir met with Eastern Libyan State President Khalifa Haftar – believed to be the first meeting between two self-styled Field Marshals. They reportedly finalised a deal to supply Pakistani arms worth $4.6 billion – the largest such deal ever by Islamabad – to the Benghazi-based Libyan National Army (LNA) headed by the 82-year-old warlord.

Since the overthrow of leader Muammar Qadhafi in 2011, the LNA has been in a sputtering but inconclusive civil war with the Tripoli-based internationally recognised Government of National Unity (GNU).

An arms push

Haftar regarded his first-ever visit to Pakistan as important enough to send his Prime Minister two days ahead, and bring along Saddam, his son and putative heir. The deal reportedly comprises 16 fully loaded JF-17 fighter jets (built in Pakistan with Chinese assistance, a Russian engine and some Turkish missiles) and 12 Super Mushak trainer aircraft over the next 30 months. As neither the LNA nor the GNU currently has a worthwhile air component, Haftar hopes that the Pakistani game-changing supplies will enable him to win the civil war. Some reports indicate that the deal is being funded by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which has long supported Haftar.

Pakistan has also been chasing a similar opportunity in Sudan, another Arab country afflicted by civil war for the past three years. It is negotiating to sell $1.5 billion worth of defence equipment to the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), currently waging a bloody war against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). While the initial deal reportedly involves 10 Karakorum-8 light attack aircraft, more than 200 drones, and advanced air defence systems, it may eventually include JF-17 fighter jets, raising the price tag to $4 billion. There are hints that Saudi Arabia may finance this transfer through the waiver of loans owed to it by Islamabad.

Leveraging recent developments, such as the claimed successes in the May 2025 India-Pakistan conflict, U.S. President Donald Trump’s White House welcome for Asim Munir, the signing of the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement with Saudi Arabia, and the UAE President’s visit to Islamabad, Pakistan has turbocharged its defence exports. It claims to have already supplied JF-17s to Azerbaijan, Myanmar and Nigeria, and has offered them to Bangladesh. If Pakistan’s claimed and potential deals are cumulated, they reach $13 billion.

But then, several constraining factors could intervene to dampen the optimism. First, Pakistan’s capacity to produce the JF-17 is limited to about 25 units a year to be shared between domestic requirements and exports. Lacking an industrial base of its own, it largely assembles these fighters from foreign-sourced components, creating dependencies. Second, these transactions are often made to recipients dependent on third-party financing, a pinch point. Third, the deals often pose tricky legal and geopolitical issues — both Libya and Sudan are currently under United Nations arms embargoes, and the two megadeals are buffeted by the Saudi-UAE rivalry, making them an awkward balancing act for Rawalpindi. The possibility of Haftar supplying Pakistani arms to RSF (supported by the UAE) cannot be ruled out, which would put its weapons with both the Sudanese belligerents. Moreover, the hype about the combat-proven success against India may eventually wear out, revealing shoddy, incompetent products, and result in a reversal. Finally, Munir’s bromance with Mr. Trump may be a mixed blessing: While Mr. Trump may bless the transactional activities of his favourite Field Marshal, he may disfavour Munir acting as a conduit for the Chinese military hardware to a region that Washington regards as its fiefdom.

In the past, Washington has often found it convenient to subcontract the Gulf security to Pakistan. The current episode seemed different, with the Gulf monarchies using the same subcontractor to fortify their respective regional proxies. In this game, the GHQ Rawalpindi is all trumps: it gets hard cash, earns brownie points from the cash-rich Gulf monarchies and expands its outreach to regional hotspots for future security aggregation. Unlike in the past, Pakistanis are only supplying hardware and training, without putting boots on the ground.

A growing role

Pakistan’s growing role as a net security provider to the Gulf and beyond should concern New Delhi. India has a much stronger economic engagement with the Gulf than Pakistan, which has, hitherto, been seeking handouts. However, Pakistan’s success in forging a regional security and defence role would be a force multiplier, enabling it to reclaim parity with India in that region. It may make the country a hub of the military-industrial complex, creating a strategic challenge for India.

The Gulf’s growing security dependence on Pakistan also helps Islamabad to wash away the taint of terrorism, dodgy financial practices and drug running, earning it plaudits from Beijing and Washington. All these developments may embolden GHQ Rawalpindi to revive terrorism in India, notwithstanding New Delhi’s threat of retaliation, which, if it happens, may afford Pakistan a chance to conflate a fresh false narrative about a military success.

The recent Pakistani defence salesmanship scoops should prompt us to ask how this neighbour can upstage us in our backyard? While the Pakistani economy and manufacturing are a tenth and a thirteenth of India’s, respectively, thanks to extensive joint ventures with China and Türkiye, its annual defence production has reached $7 billion, compared to India’s $18 billion. Its sales pitch has been sophisticated and multi-pronged – leveraging Islamic solidarity, military-to-military links, and aggressive pricing.

Unlike India, Pakistan’s defence exports and military establishment do not work in silos. Last December, Munir personally visited Benghazi to consummate the deal with Saddam Haftar. Similarly, the PAF chief led the negotiations with Saudi Arabia and SAF. Earlier, Islamabad supplied around $400 million of ammunition to Ukraine. While some may regard these deals as morally and legally questionable, GHQ Rawalpindi has single-mindedly pursued them regardless. Pakistan’s gains may not be India’s loss in material terms, but these, nevertheless, tilt the geopolitics in its favour.

Steps for India

While India’s defence exports have grown rapidly to stand at $2.8 billion in 2024-25, Pakistan has shown that an asymptotic surge is achievable with greater endeavour and passion. As a more responsible and self-respecting country adhering to international law, India cannot replicate Pakistani tactics. Yet, India can leverage its indigenous defence industry more effectively for exports. India should prioritise defence exports for their financial and political spin-offs, focusing particularly on its friends in the neighbourhood and the Global South. As the world’s third-largest crude importer, India can leverage its buying power to persuade its oil suppliers to redress the huge trade imbalance by procuring Indian weapon systems.

Similarly, India has sizable aid programmes and credit lines with several countries, which could be utilised to lubricate such arms deals. It could create a dedicated, nimble defence export promotion organisation embedded with the stakeholders concerned, such as the public and private defence producers, relevant experts, including those from IT and Artificial Intelligence, pertinent Ministries and funding institutions.

Such an organisation should aggressively market its defence products at various international exhibitions and bilateral events and should be empowered to negotiate and conclude deals autonomously with minimum bureaucratic controls. Only then would India have a fighting chance to tilt the current highly skewed balance of defence trade. India is currently the world’s second-largest arms importer and ranks low among the top 25 defence exporters. The difference between the two ranks needs to be bridged.

Mahesh Sachdev is a former Indian Ambassador specialising in oil and West Asia

Published – March 04, 2026 12:16 am IST