Pakistan and the Board of Peace

When Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif made an appearance at the inaugural meeting of the Board of Peace organised by U.S. President Donald Trump, it was clear that Pakistan was desperate to be seen, counted and photographed at the right tables. After all, visibility is a strategic asset for a country that fears diplomatic marginalisation and understands the currency of optics in contemporary geopolitics. For the military-dominated hybrid regime, it was enough to make a statement that Pakistan is relevant in global deliberations.

In the Trumpian age, when exclusion can easily lead to irrelevance, the mere fact of holding a seat may appear significant. However, when the discussion moved from communiqués to commitments, and more specifically to the establishment of an International Stabilisation Force in Gaza, Pakistan was not among nations announced to have committed troops. Islamabad has chosen mere visibility over actionable engagement. And this hesitation is neither surprising nor accidental. It is structural, rooted in Pakistan’s domestic constraints and a foreign policy culture that prizes symbolic visibility.

Within the country, Pakistan’s role in the BoP has been projected as principled support for Gaza and its political commitment to the Palestinian people. The statements issued by the hybrid regime have been focused on humanitarian assistance and the broader peace in Gaza. However, there are deeper, complex drivers that have been at work. Islamabad has been trying to establish itself as the premier voice of the Muslim world, particularly on the issue of Palestine, where verbal support translates into symbolic capital in the Global South. The cause is deeply embedded in its own politics and national identity and thus reinforces both ideological discourses and civil-military consensus. Supporters of Pakistan’s hybrid regime argue that to be absent from such a high-profile, Trump-led initiative would have compromised Pakistan’s claim to moral and political authority in Islamic discourse and handed over the discursive space to its regional rivals. It was not an option to be there, but a strategic imperative to remain relevant in regional and transnational political hierarchies.

Struggle for centrality

However, there is another consequential dimension of the Pakistani thought process that is inseparable from its strategic rivalry with India. With gradual expansion of Indian diplomatic influence in West Asia, where it is simultaneously building strategic relationships with Gulf monarchies and Israel, also extending humanitarian efforts to the Palestinians, Pakistan is left struggling to maintain its centrality in the regional narrative. For Pakistan, the BoP presents a chance to deflect the impression that India can also become a credible player on the diplomatic front across West Asia. By being one of the first to fall in line with Trump’s initiative, Pakistan could position itself as a force in shaping Gaza’s post-war order. Moreover, by participating in photo opportunities, making statements of support and positioning itself in support of Trump’s Gaza plan, Pakistan has been demonstrating its cooperation in the hope of gaining American support for its irredentist claims in Kashmir. However, the difference between claiming to be a rhetorical force and being a committed one is significant. When tangible troop contributions were required, the limits of Pakistan’s diplomatic theatre became unavoidable, exposing the structural realities of its regional positioning.

Countries such as Indonesia, Morocco, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, and Albania have signalled readiness to deploy personnel. Their decision reflects a willingness to translate diplomatic endorsement into operational commitment, even at the risk of entanglement in a volatile theatre. Pakistan, with perhaps one of the biggest and most experienced peacekeeping military forces in the developing world, has chosen not to participate. This is a telling indicator. It is an indication that Islamabad’s participation is less constrained by capacity and more by the fragility of its domestic political dynamics.

The internal political environment in Pakistan does not provide much leeway regarding matters that have implications for Palestine. The level of Pakistani public support for Palestine is highly empathetic and politicians tend to engage in a competition to prove their ideological commitment through highly publicised gestures. Religious groups such as Jamaat-e-Islami have already cautioned against any military engagement that could be seen as compromising Palestinian resistance. Even a non-committal role in stabilisation efforts could be seen as collaboration if the mandate of the force includes dealing coercively with Hamas. As a regime that is already facing severe challenges on the economic front and political legitimacy, the threat of domestic unrest related to a foreign deployment is a strong deterrent, no matter how much personal reputation of Field Marshal Asim Munir is at stake internationally. Pakistan continues to remain highly constrained by its domestic ideological imperatives.

High political cost

The stabilisation force in Gaza is exactly the kind of challenge that separates rhetorical leadership from operational responsibility. Pakistan’s ruling elite can and does make strong statements in support of Palestinian rights. Its leaders can go to conferences and support peace frameworks. But to send its troops into a hotspot where they may be called upon to enforce security arrangements against Palestinian factions would put the hybrid regime itself at risk of charges of betrayal. The political cost would be immediate and high.

There is also the issue of bandwidth. The Pakistan military is still heavily engaged along its western border and in its internal security roles. The myriad economic challenges also impose their own set of constraints. While none of these make it impossible to deploy, they certainly increase the political risk.

Another level of complexity is introduced by Trump’s idiosyncratic leadership style. His foreign policy approach is to reward those who visibly fall into line. During carefully staged public meetings involving the BoP, Trump has often acted as impresario, gesturing towards PM Sharif as if holding out living proof of his self-proclaimed status as sub-continental peacemaker. The scene is less diplomacy than drama, and the Pakistani Prime Minister’s presence becomes a prop to shore up Trump’s assertion that he cooled the India-Pakistan tensions last year. Pakistan is ready to be paraded, applauding on demand, singing paeans that cost little but dignity. There is a purpose to this tamasha which goes on because it supports both Trump and Pakistan’s hybrid regime simultaneously. The question is not whether Trump will make instrumental use of the Munir-Sharif duo, but for how long the script will last.

Pakistan’s initial support for the BoP and its verbal commitment to reconstruction efforts can be seen as a move to keep on the right side of the Trump administration. However, when faced with the concrete demand for troops, Islamabad has opted for caution. This confirms the hypothesis that closer alignment with great power initiatives is only possible when the domestic base is secure. This also reflects the contradiction in Pakistan’s diplomatic identity. It wants to be a leader in the cause of Muslim unity while at the same time establishing strategic partnerships with Western countries to counterbalance India. While there is no necessary contradiction between these two goals, it is not easy to balance them for a regime that misleadingly claims to be democratic. The Gaza stabilisation plan presents a dilemma in this regard.

The Pakistani stance highlights the inherent weaknesses of a foreign policy that is too dependent on external endorsement in the absence of internal cohesion. When international initiatives demand concrete contributions rather than declaratory support, those vulnerabilities are difficult to hide. This in no way diminishes the complexity of the Gaza tragedy. It does, however, shed light on the structural constraints that shape Islamabad’s policy preferences. Mere attendance at the BoP meeting will not allow Pakistan to signal its relevance even as abstention from the stabilization force would help preserve fragile domestic equilibrium.

Vinay Kaura is an Assistant Professor in the Department of International Affairs and Security Studies at Sardar Patel University of Police, Security and Criminal Justice, Rajasthan. Views expressed are personal

Published – February 26, 2026 12:50 am IST